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Abstract
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that
targets one of the most fundamental software caches in mod-
ern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The
page cache is a pure software cache that contains all disk-
backed pages, including program binaries, shared libraries,
and other files, and our attacks thus work across cores and
CPUs. Our side-channel permits unprivileged monitoring of
some memory accesses of other processes, with a spatial res-
olution of 4 kB and a temporal resolution of 2 µs on Linux
(restricted to 6.7 measurements per second) and 466 ns on
Windows (restricted to 223 measurements per second); this
is roughly the same order of magnitude as the current state-
of-the-art cache attacks. We systematically analyze our side
channel by demonstrating different local attacks, including
a sandbox bypassing high-speed covert channel, timed user-
interface redressing attacks, and an attack recovering auto-
matically generated temporary passwords. We further show
that we can trade off the side channel’s hardware agnos-
tic property for remote exploitability. We demonstrate this
via a low profile remote covert channel that uses this page-
cache side-channel to exfiltrate information from a malicious
sender process through innocuous server requests. Finally,
we propose mitigations for some of our attacks, which have
been acknowledged by operating system vendors and slated
for future security patches.
1 Introduction
Modern processors are highly optimized for performance
and efficiency. A large share of these optimizations is based
upon caching - taking advantage of temporal and spatial lo-
cality to minimize slower memory or disk accesses. Indeed,
caching architectures typically fetch or prefetch code and
data into fast buffers closer to the processor.
Although side-channels have been known and utilized pri-
marily in military contexts for decades [41, 78], the idea of
cache side-channel attacks gained more attention over the
last twenty years [3, 40, 53]. Osvik et al. [51] showed that
an attacker can observe the cache state at the granularity of
a cache set using Prime+Probe, and later Yarom et al. [77]
showed this with cache line granularity using Flush+Reload.
While different cache attacks have different use cases, the
accuracy of Flush+Reload remains unrivaled.
Indeed, virtually all Flush+Reload attacks target pages in
the so-called page cache [30, 33, 34, 35, 42, 77]. The page
cache is a pure software cache implemented in all major op-
erating systems today, and it contains virtually all pages in
use. Pages that contain data accessible to multiple programs,
such as disk-backed pages (e.g., program binaries, shared li-
braries, other files, etc.), are shared among all processes re-
gardless of privilege and permission boundaries [24]. The
operating system uses the page cache to store frequently
used pages in memory, this obviating slow disk loads when-
ever a process needs to access said pages. There is a large
body of works exploiting Flush+Reload in various scenarios
over the past several years [30, 33, 34, 35, 42, 77]. There
have also been a series of software (side-channel) cache
attacks in the literature, including attacks on the browser
cache [5, 20, 36, 37, 72] and exploiting page deduplica-
tion [2, 6, 26, 52, 55, 68, 75, 76]; however, page dedupli-
cation is mostly disabled or limited to deduplication within a
security domain today [46, 56, 71].
In this paper, we present a new attack on the operating sys-
tem page cache. We present a set of local attacks that work
entirely without any timers, utilizing operating system calls
(mincore on Linux and QueryWorkingSetEx on Windows)
to elicit page cache information. We also show that page
cache metadata can leak to a remote attacker over a network
channel, producing a stealthy covert channel between a ma-
licious local sender process and an external attacker.
We comprehensively evaluate and characterize the
software-cache side channel by comparing it to hardware-
cache side channels. Like the recent DRAMA attack [54,
73], our side-channel attack works across cores and across
CPUs with a spatial granularity of 4 kB. For comparison, the
spatial granularity of the DRAMA attack is 2 kB on dual-
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channel systems up to and including the Haswell processor
architecture, and 1 kB on more recent dual-channel systems.
The temporal granularity of the DRAMA attack is around
300 ns, whereas the temporal granularity of our attack is 2 µs
on Linux (restricted to 6.7 measurements per second) and
466 ns on Windows (restricted to 223 measurements per sec-
ond). Hence, we conclude that our attack can compete with
the current state-of-the-art in microarchitectural attacks.
Finally, we present several ways to mitigate our attack in
software, and observe that certain page replacement algo-
rithms reduce the applicability of our attack while simulta-
neously improving the system performance. In our respon-
sible disclosure, both Microsoft and the Linux security team
acknowledged the problem and informed us that they will
follow our recommendations with security patches to miti-
gate our attack.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1. We present a novel attack targeting the page cache.
2. We present a high-speed covert channel which is agnostic
to specific hardware configurations.
3. We present a set of local attacks which can compete with
state-of-the-art microarchitectural attacks.
4. We present a remote attack which can leak information
across the network.
We begin in Section 2 with background information on
hardware caches, cache attacks, and software caches, fol-
lowed by our threat model in Section 3. Section 4 overviews
our attack. Section 5 presents a novel method to spy on the
page cache state. Section 6 shows how page cache eviction
can be done efficiently on Linux and Windows. Section 7
presents (timing-free) local page cache attacks. Section 8
presents remote page cache attacks. Section 9 discusses dif-
ferent countermeasures against our attack. Section 10 con-
cludes our work.
2 Background
We begin with a brief discussion of hardware and software
cache attacks, followed by some background on the operat-
ing system page cache that we exploit.
2.1 Hardware and Software Cache Side-
Channel Attacks
The suggestion of cache attacks harks back to the timing at-
tacks of Kocher [40]. Osvik et al. [51] presented a technique
with a finer granularity called Prime+Probe. Yarom et al.
[77] presented Flush+Reload, which is still today the cache
attack technique with the highest accuracy (virtually no false
negatives or false positives) and a finer granularity than most
other attacks (one cache line). Consequently, Flush+Reload
is also used in other applications, including the covert chan-
nel in Spectre [39] and Meltdown [43]. Flush+Reload re-
quires shared memory with the victim application. However,
all modern operating systems share code and unmodified
data of every program and shared library (and any unmod-
ified file-backed page in general) across privilege boundaries
and applications.
Caches also exist in software, caching remote data, data
that has been retrieved from slow or offline storage, or pre-
computed results. Some of these caches have very specific
use-cases, such as browser caches used for website content;
other caches are more generic, such as the page cache that
stores a large portion of code and data used. Caches make
use of the principle of locality to retain common computa-
tions closer to the processor, and consequently they can leak
information about the cache contents.
For example, browser caches leak information about
browsing history and other possibly sensitive user informa-
tion [5, 20, 36, 37, 72]. Requested resources may have dif-
ferent access times, depending on whether the resource is
being served from a local cache or a remote server, and
these differences can be distinguished by an attacker. As
another example of a software-based side channel, page-
deduplication attacks exploit page deduplication across secu-
rity boundaries. A copy-on-write page fault reveals the fact
that the requested page was deduplicated and that another
process must have a page with identical content. Suzaki et al.
[68] presented the first page-deduplication attack, which
detected programs running in co-located virtual machines.
Subsequently, several other page-deduplication attacks were
demonstrated [26, 52, 75, 76]. Today, page deduplication is
either completely disabled for security reasons or restricted
to deduplication within a security domain [6, 46, 55, 56].
2.2 Operating System Page Cache
Virtual memory creates the illusion for each involved pro-
cess of running alone on the system. To do this, it provides
isolation between processes so that different processes may
operate on the same addresses without interfering with each
other. Each virtual memory page may be mapped by the op-
erating system, with varying properties, to an arbitrary phys-
ical memory page.
When multiple processes map a virtual page to the same
physical page, this page is part of shared memory. Shared
memory typically may arise out of inter-process communi-
cation or, more broadly, to reduce physical memory con-
sumption. For example, if shared library and common bi-
nary pages on the hard disk are mapped multiple times by
different processes, they map to the same pages in physical
memory.
Indeed, any page that might be used by more than one
process may be mapped as shared memory. However, if a
process wants to write to such a page, it must first secure
a private copy of the page, so as not to break the isolation
between processes. The efficiency savings come because a
great many pages are never modified and, instead, remain
shared among multiple processes in a read-only state.
The operating system page cache is a generalization of the
above memory sharing scenario, and, in fact, all modern op-
erating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux, and OS X) imple-
ment a page cache. The page cache contains all pages that are
memory mapped files, any file read from the disk, and (de-
pending on the system) possibly other pages such as anony-
mous pages or shared memory [24]. The operating system
keeps track of which pages in the page cache are clean (i.e.,
their data is unmodified from the disk version) and which
are dirty (i.e., modified since they were first loaded from the
disk). Ideally, the page cache incorporates all available mem-
ory, allowing the operating system to minimize the disk I/O.
The introduction of a page cache disrupts the traditional
functioning of the operating system under a page fault. With-
out a page cache, the operating system reserves a free phys-
ical page frame, loads the data from the disk into that physi-
cal page frame, and then maps a virtual page to the physical
page frame accordingly. If there are no available physical
page frames, the system swaps out pages to the disk using
an operating system-dependent page-replacement algorithm.
In Linux, this algorithm had traditionally been based on a
variant of the Least Recently Used (LRU) paradigm [11],
and LRU-related data structures can still be found through-
out the kernel code. More recent Linux versions implement
an improved variant called CLOCK-Pro [38] along with sev-
eral adaptions [12]. Within this improved framework, Linux
moves pages among multiple lists (an inactive list, an ac-
tive list, and a recently evicted list). In contrast to Linux,
Windows uses the working-set model of page caching to in-
troduce more fairness among processes competing for mem-
ory [8, 16, 17]. The page replacement algorithm used on
Windows was based on Clock or pseudo-random replace-
ment [23, 60] in older Windows versions, and today is likely
a variant of the Aging algorithm [7].
With a page cache, the operating system endeavors to
make full use of all physical page frames, and a page-
replacement algorithm is still needed for evicting page cache
pages (swapping is less relevant on modern operating sys-
tems [14, 15, 32]). Also pages from KVM virtual machines
are cached in the host-side page cache if the machine is con-
figured to use a write-back caching strategy [18].
Both Linux and Windows provide mechanisms
for checking whether a page is resident in the page
cache - the mincore system call for Linux, and the
QueryWorkingSetEx system call for Windows.
3 Threat Model
Our threat model is based on the threat model for Flush+
Reload [30, 33, 34, 35, 42, 77].
Specifically, we assume that attacker and victim have ac-
cess to the same operating system page cache. On Linux,
we also assume that the attacker has read access to the tar-
get page, which may be any page of any attacker-accessible
file on the system. This assumption is satisfied, for example,
when attacker and victim are
• processes running under the same operating system, or
• processes running in isolated sandboxes with shared files
(e.g., Firejail [21]).
On Windows, read access to the target page is not necessary
for our attack.
Our local attacks are timing-free, in that they do not rely
on hardware timing differences. Our remote attack leverages
timing differences between memory and disk access, mea-
sured on a remote system, as a proxy for the required local
information.
4 High-Level View of the Attack
Our attack fundamentally relies on the attacker’s capability
to distinguish whether a page is in the page cache or not. In
the local attack we are agnostic to the underlying hardware,
i.e., we do not exploit any timing differences although this
would be practically possible on virtually all systems. Thus,
we use the mincore system call on Linux for this purpose
and the QueryWorkingSetEx system call on Windows. The
mincore system call returns which pages of a memory range
are present in memory (i.e., in the page cache) and which are
not. Likewise, the QueryWorkingSetEx system call returns
a list of pages that are in the current working set of a process,
and thus are present in the page cache.
Bringing the page cache into a known state is not triv-
ial, as it behaves like a fully associative cache. Previous ap-
proaches for page cache eviction can lead to out-of-memory
situations [28, 66, 71] or consume too much time and im-
pose system pressure [27]. This is not practical when evict-
ing pages often, e.g., multiple times per second. Hence,
they have not been used in published side-channel attacks
so far, but only to support other attacks, e.g., relocation of
a page for Rowhammer. For Linux, we devise a working-
set-based eviction strategy that efficiently accesses groups of
other pages more frequently than the page to evict.
On Windows, our attack is much more efficient than on
Linux. On Linux, the page cache is directly influenced by
all processes. In contrast, Windows has per-process working
sets [47], and the page cache is influenced indirectly through
these working sets. Hence, for Windows, we present an at-
tack which evicts pages only from the working set of the
victim process, but not from the page cache (i.e., not from
DRAM), i.e., causing no additional disk accesses. Although
both attack variants follow the same attack methodology, we
have to distinguish between the Linux and Windows variant
at several places in the remainder of the paper.
In contrast to hardware cache attacks and page-
deduplication attacks, our local attacks are non-destructive,
allowing us to repeat measurements. Measuring whether
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Figure 1: Attack overview.
a memory location is cached or not manipulates the state
such that the information is not available anymore at a later
point in both hardware cache attacks [51, 77] and page-
deduplication attacks [52, 68]. However, it is not the case
for our local attack. As we rely on the mincore and
QueryWorkingSetEx system calls, we can arbitrarily check
whether the page is in the page cache (on Linux) or the pro-
cess working set [47] (Windows). These checks are non-
destructive as they neither modify nor influence the state of
the page cache or the process working set with respect to the
target memory location.
Our attack is illustrated in Figure 1. The attacker wants
to measure when the function foo() is called by a victim
program. The attacker determines the page which contains
the function foo(). By observing when the page is in the
page cache, the attacker learns when foo() was called.
Our attack continuously runs through the following steps:
Initially, the target pages are in the page cache (on Linux)
respectively the working set of the victim process (on Win-
dows). After the eviction, the page is not in the page cache
(Linux) or process working set (Windows) anymore. The at-
tacker can now continuously probe when the page is added
back in. As soon as the page is found in the page cache
(Linux) or the process working set (Windows), the attacker
logs the memory access and evicts the page again.
In the following sections, we detail the two main steps of
the attack, i.e., determining the page cache state (defining the
temporal resolution) and performing the page cache eviction
(defining the maximum frequency at which the attack can be
performed).
5 Determining the Page Cache State
In this section, we discuss how to determine the page cache
state. Note that although our attack starts with the page cache
eviction, following the attack description is easier when un-
derstanding how to determine the page cache state first.
The attacker wants to determine when a specific page from
a shared library is loaded into the page cache, as this is ex-
actly the time of the access by the victim program. Thus,
the shared library containing the target page an attacker
wants to observe accesses to has to be mapped into the at-
tacker’s address space. This is possible using mmap on Linux
and either LoadLibraryEx or CreateFileMappingA and
MapViewOfFile on Windows.
To map the shared library, the user only requires read-only
access to the file containing the target page. As the attacker
process works on its own mapping of the shared library, all
addresses are observed relative to the start of the shared li-
brary. Hence, security mechanisms such as Address Space
Layout Randomization (ASLR) have no effect on our attack.
To determine whether or not a page is in the page cache,
we rely on the operating-system provides APIs to query the
page cache. On Linux, this API is provided by the mincore
system call. mincore expects the base address and length of
a memory area and returns a vector indicating for each page
whether it is in the page cache or not. On Windows, there
are two variants which are discussed as follows.
5.1 Windows Process Working-Set State
On Windows, every process has a working set which is a
very small subset of the page cache. We cannot query the
page cache directly as on Linux but instead we focus on
the working set. While this makes determining the cache
state more complex, the following eviction is much eas-
ier and faster (cf. Section 6.2). On Windows, we rely
on the QueryWorkingSetEx system call. This function
takes a process handle and an array specifying the vir-
tual addresses of interest as arguments. It returns a vec-
tor of structures which, if the page is part of the work-
ing set, contain various information about the correspond-
ing pages. In contrast to the official documentation [47],
the QueryWorkingSetEx system call only requires the
PROCESS QUERY LIMITED INFORMATION permission. By
default, the attacker process has this permission for handles
of other processes of the same user and even for some pro-
cesses with a higher integrity level (as part of the generic
execute access) [48]. We devise two different variants to de-
termine whether or not a page is in the working set of a pro-
cess based on the return value of the QueryWorkingSetEx
system call.
Variant 1: Low Share Count and Attacker-Readable.
The ShareCount represents the number of processes that
have this page in their working set. It is one of the mem-
bers in the structure returned by QueryWorkingSetEx. Un-
fortunately, the value is capped to 7 processes, i.e., if more
processes have the page in their working set, the number
remains 7. However, as the working-set size is limited to
1.4 MB by default, this rarely happens for a page. In fact,
most pages in the page cache have a ShareCount of 0 due
to the small working-set sizes. With this variant, we do not
need any permissions for other processes. Hence, we can
mount the attack even across users without restrictions.
Variant 2: High Share Count or Not Attacker-Readable.
If the ShareCount is 7 or larger, we cannot gain any
information by calling QueryWorkingSetEx on our own
process. Instead, we can use QueryWorkingSetEx di-
rectly on the victim process, i.e., the attacking process must
have the PROCESS QUERY LIMITED INFORMATION permis-
sion for the victim process handle. As QueryWorkingSetEx
takes virtual addresses, we need to figure out the virtual ad-
dress. This is not a problem if pages from shared files are
targeted (e.g., shared libraries) as they are typically mapped
to the same virtual address in different processes. How-
ever, if the pages are not shared, i.e., not attacker-readable,
QueryWorkingSetEx still leaks information if the virtual
address is known. Hence, we can use QueryWorkingSetEx
to determine directly whether the target page is in the work-
ing set of the victim process.
5.2 Spatial and Temporal Granularity
One limitation of our attack is the coarse spatial granular-
ity of 4 kB, i.e., one page. This is identical to a recent at-
tack on TLB entries [25] and similar to the DRAMA at-
tack [54, 73] on a single-channel DDR3 system, which has
the same spatial granularity (one 4 kB page). The spatial
granularity of the DRAMA attack increases with the num-
ber of banks, ranks, channels, and processors. It is 2 kB on
dual-channel systems up to Haswell, and 1 kB on more re-
cent dual-channel systems. If a target region contains other
frequently used data, the signal-to-noise ratio decreases in
our attack just as it does for the DRAMA attack. However,
this just increases the number of measurements an attacker
has to perform.
The temporal granularity of the DRAMA attack is con-
strained by the time it takes to run one or two rounds of
Flush+Reload, which is around 300 ns [54, 73]. The tem-
poral granularity of our attack is constrained by the time
the system call consumes, which we observed to be 2.04 µs
on average for mincore with a standard error of 20 ns, and
465.91 ns on average for QueryWorkingSetEx with a stan-
dard error of 0.20 ns. Hence, on Linux, it is only 6.8 times
lower than the DRAMA attack, and on Windows only 55 %
lower than the DRAMA attack. Thus, our attack can be used
as a reasonable replacement for the hardware-dependent
DRAMA attack. However, as we describe in Section 6, the
eviction limits how often an attacker can measure, i.e., 6.7
times per second on Linux and 223 times per second on Win-
dows.
5.3 Alternatives to mincore and
QueryWorkingSetEx
As an alternative to mincore on Linux, we also investi-
gated whether it is possible to mount the same attack us-
ing procfs information, namely /proc/self/pagemap.
However, /proc/self/pagemap only shows the informa-
tion from the page translation tables. As operating systems
commonly use lazy page mapping, the page is in practice
not mapped into the attacker process and thus, the informa-
tion in /proc/self/pagemap does not change. Further-
more, as a response to Rowhammer attacks [66], access to
/proc/self/pagemap was first restricted and nowadays it
is often not accessible by unprivileged processes.
As a more generic alternative to mincore and
QueryWorkingSetEx, we investigated the timing of
pagefaults as another source of information. Accessing a
page may trigger a pagefault. Measuring the time it takes to
handle the pagefault reveals whether it was a soft pagefault,
mapping a page already present in the page cache, or a
regular pagefault, loading data from the disk. The timing
differences we observed there are easy to distinguish, with
1 to 2 orders of magnitude between the two cases. In our
remote attack we exploit these timing differences. However,
this makes page cache eviction more difficult as the accessed
page is now the least-recently used one.
Finally, as stated in Section 3, our local attacks are entirely
attack hardware-agnostic. Hence, we cannot use any timing
differences in our local attacks.
6 Page Cache Eviction
In this section, we discuss how page cache eviction can
be implemented efficiently on Linux and Windows systems.
Page cache eviction is the process of accessing enough pages
in the right way such that a target page is evicted. We show
that we improve over state-of-the-art eviction algorithms by
1 to 2 orders of magnitude, enabling practical side-channel
attacks through the page cache for the first time.
Less efficient variants of page cache eviction have been
used in previous work [27, 31]. Holen et al. [31] generates a
large amount of data, simply exhausting the physical mem-
ory. Using this approach it takes 8 s or more to evict a tar-
get page on Linux. Furthermore, when reproducing their re-
sults we observed severe stability issues, constantly leading
to crashes and system lock-ups during eviction. The tech-
nique presented by Gruss et al. [27] takes 2.68 s on Linux to
evict a target page. On Windows, their technique is slower,
with an average execution time of 10.1 s. State-of-the-art mi-
croarchitectural side-channel attacks have a higher temporal
resolution by more than 6 orders of magnitude [45, 54, 77].
Hence, we can conclude that page cache eviction, as done in
previous work, is far too slow for side-channel attacks with a
relevant frequency. We solve this problem by combining the
technique from Section 5 with efficient page cache eviction
on Linux (Section 6.1) and process working-set eviction on
Windows (Section 6.2).
6.1 Efficient Page Cache Eviction on Linux
The optimal cache eviction for the attacker would evict only
the target page of the victim, without affecting other cached
pages. Hence, our idea is to mostly access pages which are
already in the page cache (to keep them there) and also ac-
cess a few non-cached pages in order to evict the target page.
In a feasibility analysis, we measured how many pages an
attacker can locate inside the page cache. On our test system,
we had 1 040 542 files accessible to the attacker program,
amounting to 77 GB of disk space. We found that less than
1 % of the files had pages in the page cache, still amounting
to 68 % to 72 % of the total page cache pages. This informa-
tion is all available to an unprivileged attacker using system
calls like mmap and mincore. The attacker creates a long list
of all pages currently in the page cache. The attacker also
creates a list of further pages that could be loaded into the
page cache to increase memory pressure. Both lists can be
updated occasionally to reflect changes in the system mem-
ory use. The attacker adapts the amount of pages accessed in
these two lists to achieve efficient cache eviction.
This is done by creating 3 eviction sets:
Eviction Set 1. These are pages already in the page cache,
used by other processes. To keep them in the page cache,
a thread continuously accesses these pages while also keep-
ing the system load low by using sched yield and sleep.
Consequently, they are among the most recently accessed
pages of the system and eviction of these pages becomes
highly unlikely.
Eviction Set 2. These are pages not yet in the page cache.
Using mincore, we can check whether the target page was
evicted, and stop the eviction immediately, reducing the evic-
tion runtime. Pages in this eviction set are randomly ac-
cessed, to avoid repeated accesses and thus any similarity
to the pages in eviction set 1 for the replacement algorithm.
Eviction Set 3. If swapping is disabled, we use another
eviction set, namely non-evictable pages, e.g., dynamic con-
tent. These pages are only created and filled with content, but
never again read or written. As they cannot be swapped, they
block a certain amount of memory, reducing the required
eviction-set size. This reduces the runtime of the eviction
significantly. Still, this introduces no stability issues, as we
always keep a large amount of pages ready for immediate
eviction, i.e., the previous 2 eviction sets.
Alternative Approaches and Optimizations. We investi-
gated whether the file system influences the attack perfor-
mance. For our tests, we used ext4 as a file system. We
compared the attack performance by running our attack on
XFS and ReiserFS. However, we only found negligible tim-
ing differences.
We also investigated whether the use of the madvise
and posix fadvise system calls on Linux can improve
the attack performance. These system calls allow a pro-
grammer to provide usage hints for a given memory or
file range to the kernel. The advice MADV DONTNEED indi-
cates that the process will not access the specified pages any
time soon again, whereas the advice MADV WILLNEED indi-
cates that the process will soon access the specified pages
again. Thus, the operating system will evict the corre-
sponding pages from the page cache. We found that mark-
ing the target page as MADV DONTNEED and all eviction set
pages as MADV WILLNEED was often ignored by the ker-
nel, which ignores these hints unless the process exclusively
owns the pages (madvise) or when no other process has
the file mapped (posix fadvise). Still, this allows to use
posix fadvise on files regardless how frequently they are
accessed, e.g., via read(), as long as they are not mapped.
Hence, we are able to mount a covert channel by using
posix fadvise on a file which was not mapped by any
(other) process, instead of eviction.
6.1.1 Evaluation
We measured the precision and recall of our eviction by mon-
itoring a periodic event which was triggered every second.
The page cache eviction using all 3 eviction sets simultane-
ously achieves an average runtime of 149 ms (σ = 1.3ms)
on average and an F-Score of 1.0
Hence, while the temporal resolution of our attack is gen-
erally 2.04 µs on Linux, the rate at which events can be ob-
served in practice is lower. The reason is that, if the event oc-
curs, eviction is necessary, and thus, the temporal resolution
for events with a higher frequency is limited to 149 ms on
average. This still allows capturing more than 6 keystrokes
per second, enough to capture keystrokes accurately for most
users [64]. In this case, the temporal resolution of the
DRAMA attack is 6 orders of magnitude higher [54, 73].
The temporal resolution is also significantly higher than
that of page-deduplication attacks. The frequency at which
page deduplication happens is lower the more memory the
system has, and has in use, and the less power the device
should invest in deduplication. In practice deduplication
happens every 2 to 45 minutes, depending on the system con-
figuration [26]. Hence, our attack has an at least 800 times
higher temporal resolution than the best page-deduplication
attacks.
Limitations. One obvious limitation of our approach is that
the target page has to be in the page cache. However, as
detailed in Section 2.2, virtually all pages used by user pro-
grams end up in the page cache, even dynamically allocated
ones.
On Linux, the page must also be accessible to the attacker,
e.g., file-backed memory such as binary pages, shared library
pages, or other files. This is exactly the same requirement
(and limitation) of Flush+Reload attacks [30, 33, 34, 35, 42,
77]. Other microarchitectural attacks, e.g., Prime+Probe,
may not have this requirement but usually have other sim-
ilarly constraining requirements, such as knowledge of the
physical address which is difficult to obtain in practice [45].
Page-deduplication attacks also do not have this limitation,
but they face other limitations such as a significantly lower
temporal resolution and, more recently, that page deduplica-
tion is mostly disabled or limited to deduplication within a
security domain [46, 56, 71]. On Windows, we do not have
this limitation, i.e., we can also attack dynamically allocated
memory on Windows.
Due to the nature of the exploited side channel, our attack
comes with clear limitations. Like other cache attacks, the
side channel experiences noise if the target location is not
only used by the event the attacker wants to spy on but also
other events. This is the same limitation as for any other
cache side-channel attack [30, 77].
Another limitation which frequently poses a problem in
hardware cache attacks is prefetching [30, 77]. Unsur-
prisingly, software again implements the same techniques
as hardware. When accessing the SSD, the Linux kernel
reads ahead to increase the performance of file accesses. If
not specified otherwise, the readahead window is 32 pages
large, cf. /sys/block/sda/queue/read ahead kb. This
is similar to the adjacent line prefetcher and the stream-
ing prefetcher in hardware. Whenever a cache miss occurs,
the adjacent line prefetcher always fetches the sibling cache
line region into the cache, i.e., the adjacent 64 B. When-
ever a second cache miss within a page occurs, the stream-
ing prefetcher reads ahead of the cache miss and reads up to
512 B (i.e., 8 cache lines) into the cache. Gruss et al. [30]
noted that this limits their attack to a small number of mem-
ory locations per page. The same limitations apply to our
work, i.e., monitoring multiple pages within a 32-page win-
dow can be noisy. However, we found that this still leaves a
multitude of viable attack targets. To avoid triggering the
prefetcher, we add the pages surrounding the target page
to the eviction set 1, i.e., we reduce their chance of being
evicted, in order to avoid all noise from prefetching, as no
other page from this range will be accessed.
Finally, the attacker process can, of course, only perform
measurements and evictions when it is scheduled. Hence,
scheduling can introduce false negatives into our attack.
Again, this is also the case for hardware cache attacks [45].
Compared to previous work, we improve the state-of-the-
art for page cache eviction by a factor of more than 16 and
additionally avoid cache eviction in most cases (cf. Sec-
tion 5). With these two building blocks, we are able to
mount practical attacks as demonstrated in the following sec-
tions. The ideal target for our attack is a function or data
block which is used at frequencies below 8 times per second,
but where a temporal resolution of 2 µs can leak a sufficient
amount of information. Furthermore, our ideal target resides
on a page which is mostly accessed for this function or data
block, and not for unrelated functions or data.
6.2 Process Working-Set Eviction on Win-
dows
As previous page cache eviction techniques [27, 31] are too
slow to mount generic side-channel attacks, we pursue a
different approach on Windows. Windows has per-process
working sets [47], which (by default) are constrained to a
size between 100 kB and 1.4 MB [47]. Hence, we evict a
page from the process working set rather than from the page
cache. Our results show that the runtime of the eviction is on
par with eviction in hardware cache attacks.
We use process working-set eviction in both, covert chan-
nels and side-channel attacks. For a covert channel, the
sender can add pages to the working set, e.g., by access-
ing them. To evict pages, we use an unintended behav-
ior of VirtualUnlock that comes from a programming
error [48]. Calling VirtualUnlock on a page which is
not locked evicts it directly from the working set. For
reasons of backward-compatibility, the behavior was never
changed [48]. Additionally, pages which are only read in
one of the processes can be locked, so that they are never re-
moved from the working set. This way, arbitrary information
can be encoded into the ShareCount of the page cache pages
– up to 3 bits exist, which allows 7 sharers. Hence, we can
transmit arbitrary information without any special privileges
(as long as the receiver is not constrained by an App Con-
tainer). The default maximum working-set size is 1.4 MB.
As the page size is 4 kB, that is, there are at most 345 page
slots in the working set by default [47]. Hence, we can ex-
ploit self-eviction (from the working set) for the side chan-
nel, which can happen frequently with a little heavy memory
pressure because of the small working-set size. Pages that
are not accessed are evicted from the working set, but re-
main in RAM and mapped in the process. However, we can
speed up eviction by reducing the victim process’ working-
set size using SetProcessWorkingSetSize on the other
process [47]. The lowest possible value for the maximum
working-set size is 13 pages (52 kB).
6.2.1 Evaluation
We found that VirtualUnlock has a success rate of 100 %
over several million tests. The average time to evict a
page from the process working set with VirtualUnlock is
4.48 ms with a standard error of 3.6 µs.
Similarly to Linux (cf. Section 6.1), the higher runtime
of the eviction has a local influence on the temporal reso-
lution of our attack. Generally, the temporal resolution of
our attack on Windows is 466 ns, which is only 55 % lower
than the temporal resolution of the DRAMA attack [54, 73].
The eviction on Windows via VirtualUnlock consumes
4.48 ms, limiting the temporal resolution for high-frequency
events to 4.48 ms on average. Thus, locally the tempo-
ral resolution of the DRAMA attack is 4 orders of magni-
tude higher than the temporal resolution of the DRAMA at-
tack [54, 73]. Again, this is fast enough for inter-keystroke
timing attacks [49, 64].
While prefetching posed a relevant limitation on Linux,
it is no problem on Windows. On Windows, features like
SuperFetch fetch memory into the page cache, acting like
an intelligent hardware prefetcher or speculative execution.
Indeed, SuperFetch speculatively prefetches pages from the
disk into the main memory, based on similar past usage, e.g.,
same time of day, same sequence of applications started [63].
However, these pages are not added to the working set of any
process. Thus, our side channel remains entirely unaffected
by these Windows features. This makes the side channel very
well suited for inter-keystroke timing attacks [49, 64].
Limitations. Our attack on Windows has clear
limitations, mainly introduced by the permissions
required by the attacker. More specifically, the
SetProcessWorkingSetSize system call requires the
PROCESS SET QUOTA permission on the process han-
dle [47]. By default, the attacker process has this permission
for handles of other processes of the same user running on
the same or a lower integrity level. Processes with a higher
integrity level, e.g., processes running with Administrator
privileges, cannot be attacked using this system call [48].
The VirtualUnlock only works on our own process and
requires no permissions. Also, noise is again a limitation,
which exists for both the Linux and the Windows variant
of our attack, but this is again also true for any other cache
side-channel attack [30, 45, 77]. In our tests, we were
always able to reliably evict the page from the victim’s
working set indicating very low error rates.
7 Local Attacks
In this section we present and evaluate our local attacks.
The temporal resolution naturally scales with the perfor-
mance of the system. We perform all performance evalu-
ations on recent systems with multiple gigabytes of RAM,
with off-the-shelf mid-class consumer SSDs (e.g., transfer
rates above 250MB/s [69]). For our tests on Linux, we
have swapping disabled. This is recommended with re-
cent processors (e.g., Haswell or newer) and to reduce disk
wear [14, 15, 32]. Disabling swapping allows for a better
comparison with related work which also focuses on such
recent systems [34, 42, 54, 73].
7.1 Covert Channel
To systematically evaluate the page cache side channel, we
adapt different state-of-the-art hardware cache attacks to
it and demonstrate that they achieve a comparable perfor-
mance. In this section, we cover the first example, a covert
channel between two processes additionally isolated by run-
ning them in different Firejail sandboxes [21]. The strongly
isolated sender process sends a secret file from a restrained
environment to a receiver process which can forward the data
to the attacker.
As evicting a page is comparably slow (cf. Section 6),
and checking the state of a page is comparably fast (cf.
Section 5), it is optimal to reduce the number of evictions.
Hence, it is more efficient to transmit multiple bits at once.
We took this into account for the design of our covert chan-
nel. We follow the basic principle of hardware cache covert
channels [29, 44, 45, 54]. First, a large shared file (e.g., a
shared library) is mapped read-only into the address space of
the sender and receiver process. As described in Section 4,
we use mmap for this purpose on Linux. On Windows, we use
CreateFileMappingA and MapViewOfFile for the same
purpose.
The covert channel works by accessing or not accessing
specific pages. We use two pages to transmit a ‘READY’
signal and one page to transmit an ‘ACK’ signal. The re-
maining pages up to the end of the file are used as data trans-
mission bits. The two ‘READY’ pages are used alternately to
avoid any race conditions in the protocol between the trans-
mission of two subsequent messages. On Windows, we use
two ‘READY’ pages and two ‘ACK’ pages, for the two trans-
mission directions.
The present state of each page of the mapped file (cf. Sec-
tion 5) corresponds to one bit of the message. Hence, the
size of the file defines the maximum message size of a sin-
gle transmission. To avoid the prefetcher, we only allow a
single access in a region of 32 pages. If the file has a size S,
the (maximum) message size is computed as w= S4096·32 bits.
For instance, on Linux, Firefox’ libxul.so or Chromium’s
chromium-browser binaries are more than 100 MB large.
Similarly, large files can also be found on Windows.
These large files allow transmitting more than 3200 bits
in a single message including the 3 pages required for the
control channels. To avoid the introduction of noise, the at-
tacker can skip noisy pages, i.e., pages which are also ac-
cessed by other system activity. By combining pages from
multiple shared libraries, the attacker can easily find a sig-
nificantly higher number of pages that can be used for trans-
missions, leading to very large message sizes w. The pages
are numbered from 0,1, .., i, ..,w, i.e., it is not relevant which
file they belong to. Instead of a static list of files to check, the
attacker could also use a dynamic approach and a jamming-
agreement protocol [45].
To exchange a message, the sender first checks the present
state of the ‘ACK’ page (cf. Section 5). If the ‘ACK’ page
is present, the sender knows the receiver is ready for the
next transmission. The sender then evicts (cf. Section 6) any
pages that are mapped, e.g., from previous transmissions.
After that, the sender reads the next w bits (w is the mes-
sage size) from the secret to transmit. If the i-th bit is set,
page i page is accessed. Otherwise, page i is not accessed.
As soon as the sender is done with accessing the data trans-
mission pages, it accesses the currently to-be-set ‘READY’
page, to signal the receiver to start reading the message.
On the other side, the receiver first waits until a ‘READY’
page is present. As soon as it is set, the receiver reads the
message by analyzing the present state of the pages of the
memory mapped files. After that, the receiver accesses the
‘ACK’ page again to inform the sender that it is ready for the
next message.
While above protocol is implemented with mmap,
mincore (cf. Section 5), and page cache eviction (cf. Sec-
tion 6.1) on Linux, we use a slightly different mechanism
on Windows as we only work with working-set eviction (cf.
Section 6.2). On Windows, we lock pages in the working
set which should always remain in the working set, i.e., the
‘READY’ and ‘ACK’ bit pages of the sender and the re-
ceiver process on the corresponding receiving side. Addi-
tionally, we increase the minimal working-set size so that
none of the pages we use are removed from the working
set. We temporarily add pages into the working set by ac-
cessing them and remove pages surgically from the working
set by calling VirtualUnlock. Hence, the covert channel
information is perfectly (no information loss) stored in the
page cache in the ShareCount for the shared pages. Us-
ing QueryWorkingSetEx the receiving side can read the
ShareCount and decode the information that was encoded
in the page cache.
Performance Evaluation. We tested the implementation by
transmitting random messages between two processes. The
test system was equipped with an Intel i5-5200U processor,
8 GB DDR3-1600 RAM, and a 256 GB Samsung SSD.
For the tests on Linux, we used Ubuntu 16.04 with ker-
nel version 4.4.0-101-generic. We observed transmission
rates of up to 9.69 kB/s with an average transmission rate
of 7.04 kB/s with a standard error of 0.18 kB/s. We did
not observe any influence by the core or CPU scheduling,
which is not surprising, as both the system calls and the page
cache eviction can equally run on any core or CPU. We ob-
served a bit-error rate of less than 0.000 03 %. We also eval-
uated the covert channel in a cross-sandbox scenario using
Firejail [21]. Firejail was configured to prevent all outgoing
inter-process communication, deny all network traffic, and
only allow read access to the file system. We did not ob-
serve any influence from running the covert channel in iso-
lated Firejail sandboxes. This is not specific to Firejail but
works identically on other sandbox and container solutions
that utilize the host system page cache, e.g., Docker if con-
figured accordingly.
For the tests on Windows, we used two different hard-
ware setups with fully updated Windows 10 installations. On
the Intel i5-5200U system, we observed transmission rates
of up to 152.57 kB/s with an average transmission rate of
100.11 kB/s with a standard error of 0.79 kB/s and a bit-
error rate below 0.000 006 %. On a second system, an Intel
i7-6700K with a SanDisk Ultra II 480GB SATA SSD (run-
ning Ubuntu 19.04 with a 4.18.0-11-generic kernel), we ob-
served transmission rates of up to 278.16 kB/s with an av-
erage transmission rate of 273.44 kB/s with a standard error
of 0.23 kB/s, again with a bit-error rate below 0.000 006 %.
For a performance comparison in a similar cross-CPU sce-
nario, Pessl et al. [54] reported an error rate of 0.4 % for
their DRAMA covert channel, albeit with a channel capac-
ity of 74.5 kB/s which is much slower than our Windows-
based covert channel, but faster than our Linux-based covert
channel. Wu et al. [74] presented a cross-CPU covert
channel which achieves a channel capacity of 93.25 B/s.
Hence, our Linux covert channel outperforms this one by
two orders of magnitude and our Windows covert chan-
nel even by three to four orders of magnitude. In partic-
ular, the covert channel on the i7-6700K test system can
even compete with Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush covert
channels which require specific hardware (Intel processors)
and shared memory [29]. Thus, we conclude that our
covert channel can very well compete with state-of-the-art
hardware-component-based covert channels. Yet, our covert
channel works regardless of the presence of these leaking
hardware components.
7.2 Authentication UI Redress Attack
In this section, we present a user-interface redress attack [4,
9, 22, 50, 57, 62] which relies on our side channel as a trig-
ger. The basic idea is to detect when an interesting window
is opened and to place an identically looking fake window
over it. This can be so stealthy that even advanced users
do not notice it [22]. However, to achieve this, the latency
between the original window opening and the fake window
being placed over it must be very low. Fortunately, our side
channel provides us with exactly this capability, regardless
of any other information leakage. Note that the operating
systems authentication windows may be protected. How-
ever, other password prompts, e.g., for password managers,
browsers, and mail clients, are usually unprotected and can
be targeted in our attack.
We use our side channel to detect when a root authentica-
tion window on Ubuntu 16.04 is displayed. We detect this
with a latency of 2.04 µs on average, and it does not take us
longer to make our fake window visible and move it on top
of the real window. The user now types in the root password
in our fake window. Depending on the attacker capabilities,
the attacker can either forward the password to the real win-
dow or simply close the fake window after the password was
entered. In the latter case, the user would see the original
authentication window afterwards and likely think that the
password was rejected on the first try, e.g., because of a typ-
ing error occurred.
To identify binary pages which are used when spawning
the root authentication window, we performed an automated
template attack (cf. Section 7.3). Note that the template
attack is performed on an attacker-controlled system with
identical software installed. Hence, the attacker can take
arbitrary means (e.g., side-channel attacks or a debugger)
to find interesting memory locations that can be exploited
on the victim system. The attacker first runs a debugger-
based or cache-based template attack [30] to identify bi-
nary regions that handle the corresponding event. In a sec-
ond run, the attacker templates with our page cache side-
channel attack. In our specific case, the result of the templat-
ing was that the strongest leakage is page 2 in the binary
file polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1. Hence,
on the victim system, the attacker simply uses the previously
obtained templates to mount the attack.
Mounting the same attack on Windows 10 works even bet-
ter. Here, the latency is only 465.91 ns, which is clearly not
perceivable for a human. Also, unsurprisingly, we found that
fake windows can be created on Windows just as on Linux.
Events like authentication windows and password prompts
are very well suited for our attack due to the low frequency in
which they occur. This also makes the automated templating
for leaking pages less noisy.
7.3 Keystroke Timing Attack
In this section, we present an inter-keystroke-timing at-
tack [30, 49, 59, 67, 79] on keyboard input in the root au-
thentication window on Ubuntu 18.04. To mount a keystroke
timing attack, we first identify pages that are loaded into
the page cache when the user presses a key using a tem-
plate attack [30] (cf. Section 7.2). We target the Ubuntu
18.04 authentication window, where the user types in the
root password. In the template attack, we identified page
14 of libgksu2.so.0.0.2 as a viable target page.
Figure 2 shows two attack traces of a password entry, one
on Linux (Section 7.3) and one on Windows 10 (Section 7.3)
in notepad.exe. We obtain identical traces on Windows
when running the attack on Firefox. Note that on Linux,
for an extremely fast typing person, we could miss some
keystrokes, i.e., false negatives can occur. However, we can
gather these traces multiple times and combine the informa-
tion from multiple traces to recover highly accurate inter-
keystroke timings [49, 64]. For Windows, the temporal res-
olution is much higher, far below the timing variations of
a human [49, 64], allowing us to reliably detect and report
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Figure 2: Values returned by the page cache side channel
during a password entry on Linux (top) and while typ-
ing in an editor on Windows (bottom). On Windows we
observe key up and key down events due to the page se-
lected and the high attack frequency achievable. In both
cases, there is no noise between the keystrokes.
all inter-keystroke timings including key down and key up
events.
When running the side-channel attack on an idle system
for one hour, we did not observe a single false positive, nei-
ther on Windows nor on Linux. This is not surprising, if the
memory region is used by unrelated events we would have
already seen such noise in the template phase. However, as
the attacker can and will choose the memory region based on
the templating, the attacker chooses memory regions which
are not really used by any unrelated events. Thus, in the op-
timal case, the selected memory region is completely noise-
free. In such a case, there is no functionality in the operat-
ing systems that could lead to false positives due to spurious
cache hits. Running the attacker binary inside a Firejail sand-
box [21] had no measurable influence on the accuracy of the
attack.
7.4 PHP Password Generation
The PHP microtime function returns the current UNIX
timestamp in microseconds. It is carelessly used by some
frameworks to initialize the PHP pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG) before it is used in cryptographic oper-
ations or to generate temporary passwords [1, 19, 80]. This
is known as a bad practice and considered insecure, not least
due to side-channel attacks [80]. During our research we
found that the popular phpMyFAQ framework [58] still re-
lies on this approach.1
We mount our page cache attack on the main PHP binary
(7.0.4-7ubuntu2), on the function zif microtime. This
function is read-only and shared with any unprivileged pro-
cess including the attacker. In our case, the function resides
on page 0x1b9 (441) of the binary. By monitoring this page,
we can determine the return value of microtime at the ini-
1We responsibly disclosed this vulnerability to the developers of php-
MyFAQ who issued a patch following our recommendation.
tialization of the PRNG. Based on this, we can reconstruct
any password generated based on the same PRNG initializa-
tion, as the password generation algorithm is also publicly
available.
Due to the large variance on the runtime of PHP scripts,
we only detected an access to the microtime function with
an accuracy of ±1.5ms. However, this is practical to brute
force the range of remaining possible return values. On a
newer PHP version (7.0.30-0ubuntu0.16.04.1), we observed
an average difference of ±2.0ms. Thus, we have to try
around 4000 different passwords in the real-world attack. We
confirmed that in 85 % of the test runs, the real password of
the user was among the 4000 generated passwords from the
attacker. Hence, also in this scenario, our page cache side
channel can compete with state-of-the-art attacks [80].
Our attack also works on Windows. However, as the main
source of noise is the varying runtime of PHP, the accuracy
is not measurably better on Windows.
7.5 Oracle Attacks
Our side channel also allows implementing padding- or
length-oracle attacks. For instance, a password or token
comparison using strcmp forms a length oracle. If the at-
tacker can place the string on the page boundary, the attacker
can measure at which byte of the string the comparison ter-
minated. By manipulating the string, the attacker can figure
our the correct password or token.
We verified that this attack is practical in a small proof-
of-concept program. The attacker passes the string through
an API to the victim process. By using our page-cache- or
working-set-based side channel we can determine whether
the second page was loaded into the page cache or added to
the working set. If this was the case, the attacker learns that
the bytes on the first page were guessed correctly.
As the attacker can fully control the frequency of the mea-
surements here and can repeat the attack, we observed no
cases where we could not successfully leak the secret.
8 Remote Attack
For our remote attack we have to distinguish soft page-
faults, i.e., just mapping the page from the page cache, and
regular pagefaults, i.e., page cache misses, over a network
connection. In this scenario, two physically separated pro-
cesses wish to communicate with each other. The sender
process runs on a server and has access to information that
the attacker wants to have. However, it is unprivileged, fire-
walled, and possibly sandboxed, so it cannot reach any net-
work resources or expose files for remote access. However,
the server exposes multiple files to the public internet, e.g.,
over a web server. We also assume that the sender process
has read permissions to these files, e.g., Apache has world-
readable permissions on files in the web server root directory
6 8 10 12 14
0
50
100
Latency [ms]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y Hits
Misses
Figure 3: Timing histogram of the remote covert channel
with a 100 kB file (25 pages).
by default. The receiver process runs on a remote server,
measuring the remote access latency to pages in these public
files. Hence, the sender process can encode the information
in the page cache state of these pages.
Page Cache Hits and Misses. Of course, a remote attacker
cannot invoke mincore to check which pages are in cache,
so the attacker needs to rely on timing. Hence, we first try to
distinguish cache hits and misses over the network, similarly
to the related work in [65, 70], by performing remote ac-
cesses with and without clearing the page cache. We also en-
sured that there was no other intermediary network caching
or proxy caching active by passing appropriate HTTP head-
ers to the server. Figure 3 shows the frequencies of remote
access latencies for various cached and uncached accesses;
the figure shows that cache hits can be distinguished from
cache misses. Here, the mean access time was 8.4 ms for
cache hits and 14.2 ms for cache misses to access a file with
25 pages (around 100 kB). The latency differences between
cache hits and misses grow with the number of pages ac-
cessed. Hence, we use larger files for the subsequent remote
attacks.
8.1 Covert Channel Protocol
Figure 5 depicts how the two processes communicate over
the covert channel. The local sender process is an unprivi-
leged (possibly sandboxed) malware that encodes secret data
from the victim machine into page cache hits and misses,
and the remote receiver process decoding the secret data af-
ter measuring the remote access latency. For this, the sender
process uses one file to encode data, and another file for syn-
chronization (control file). The sender process first evicts
both the data and control files from the file system cache
(Step 1) using posix fadvise on a rarely used file, i.e., a
file which is not currently locked in memory by another pro-
cess. Note that the attacker could also use any other means
of page cache eviction as described in Section 6. It then en-
codes one bit of information in the data file (Step 2) by either
bringing it into the page cache by reading the file (encoding
a ‘1’), or not bringing it into the cache (encoding a ‘0’). Af-
ter encoding, the sender waits for the control file to be read
by the remote process (Step 3). For this, the sender uses
mincore on the control file in a loop, checking how many
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Figure 4: Transmitting a sequence of alternating ‘0’s and
‘1’s by accessing a 10 MB file (2560 pages). A threshold
can distinguish the two cases.
Figure 5: Illustration of the web server covert channel.
of the file’s pages are in the page cache. In our case, the
sender waits until 80 % of the file are cached, indicating that
the remote attacker accessed it.
The receiver process measures the access latency, infer-
ring the bits the sender process was trying to transmit (Step
4). In our experiments, the access time threshold that demar-
cated a ‘0’ from a ‘1’ was set to 105 ms for our hard drive
experiments, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Immediately after the receiver process accessed the data
file, it also accesses the control file (Step 5), to let the sender
know the next bit can be transmitted now. The sender then
continues at Step 1 again. This happens until the sender has
transmitted all bits of secret information.
Evaluation. Our experimental setup involved two sepa-
rate, but geographically close, machines, i.e., a network dis-
tance of 4 hops. The victim machine was running the Linux
Mint (kernel version 4.10.0-38) on an AMD A10-6700 with
8 GB RAM and a 977 GB hard drive. The victim machine
exposed two files to the network, data.jpg (10 MB) and
control.jpg, used as the data and control files respec-
tively. The remote machine was also running Linux Mint
(kernel version 4.13.0-37) on an Intel Core i7-7700 with
16 GB RAM and a 219 GB SSD.
For the evaluation, we transmitted 4000 bits from the local
machine to the remote machine multiple times. The trans-
mission took 517 s on average, which corresponds to an av-
erage bit rate of 7.74 bit/s and an average bit error rate of
0.2 %. This is a higher bit rate than several other remote
covert channels [10, 13, 65]. The bit rate can be further
increased by encoding information through more than one
file, which is realistic given the vast number of files most
web servers today have. To increase stealthiness, the attacker
may choose to access the two files from different IPs, as the
sender process is agnostic to this.
As our covert channel relies on timing differences, we also
repeated our experiments on a machine with an SSD. Distin-
guishing a page cache hit from a page cache miss through
timing over the network, could be more difficult as the tim-
ing differences can be smaller. To overcome this, we simply
use a larger image file (30 MB, 7680 pages) to amplify the
timing difference. However, this meant that the load latency
threshold that demarcates a read hit and miss would need to
be scaled up similarly from the previous experiment, and was
set to 300 ms for the experiments on SSDs. Furthermore, we
reduce the geographical distance between attacker and vic-
tim to 2 network hops. The victim server was running on a
machine with Linux Mint on an Intel Core i7-7700 (kernel
version 4.13.0-37) with 16 GB RAM and a recent off-the-
shelf 219 GB SSD, and the attacker machine was the same
as before. The transmission of 4000 bits, now takes 1298 s
on average, giving us an average bit rate of 3.08 bit/s at an
average bit error rate of 0.35 %. Hence, this remote timing
covert channel is also possible on a machine with an SSD.
Our proof-of-concept implementation could be further op-
timized to yield a higher transmission rate, to mount the at-
tack over a greater geographical distance, or to use smaller
files, simply by repeating measurements for each single
bit [65]. In our proof-of-concept we did not repeat any mea-
surements to obtain a single bit, again indicating the high
capacity of this remote covert channel.
8.2 Remote Side Channel
Similarly to our local side-channel attacks, we could also
mount remote side-channel attacks exploiting the page
cache. This information could be used to determine whether
certain pages or scripts have been recently accessed [70].
However, in practice it is difficult to evict the cache remotely
and eviction can be tricky without the information from the
local system. Furthermore, controlling the working set via
a huge number of remote file accesses will make the attack
very conspicuous, though it may still be practically effective
for opportunity-based attacks (e.g., password reset pages)
such as those presented in Section 7.4.
9 Countermeasures
Our side-channel attack targets the operating system page
cache via operating system interfaces and behavior. Hence,
it clearly can be mitigated by modifying the operating system
implementation.
Privileged Access. The QueryWorkingSetEx and
mincore system calls are the core of our side-channel at-
tack. Requiring a higher privilege level for these system
calls stops our attack. The downside of restricting access
to these system calls is that existing programs which cur-
rently make use of these system calls might break. Hence,
we analyzed how frequently mincore is called by any of the
software running on a typical Linux installation. We used the
Linux perf tools to measure over a 5 hour period whenever
the sys enter mincore system call is called by any appli-
cation.2 During these 5 hours a user performed regular oper-
ations on the system, i.e., running various work-related tools
like Libre Office, gcc, Clion, Thunderbird, Firefox, Nautilus,
and Evince, but also non-work-related tools like Spotify. The
system was also running regular background tasks during
this time frame. Surprisingly, the sys enter mincore sys-
tem call was not called a single time. This indicates that
making the mincore system call privileged is feasible and
would mitigate our attack at a very low implementation cost.
On Windows, there are multiple possible solutions to mit-
igate our attacks by adapting the privileges required for the
system calls we use. First of all, it is questionable why a
process can obtain working-set information of another pro-
cess via QueryWorkingSetEx. Especially, as this contra-
dicts the official documentation [47]. Second, the share
count information could be omitted from the struct returned
by QueryWorkingSetEx as it exposes information about
other processes to the attacker. The combination of these
two changes mitigates all our attack variants on Windows.
We responsibly disclosed our findings to Mi-
crosoft, and they acknowledged the problem
and will roll out these changes in Windows
10 19H1. Specifically, Windows will require
PROCESS QUERY INFORMATION for QueryWorkingSetEx
instead of PROCESS QUERY LIMITED INFORMATION to
prevent lesser privileged processes from directly obtaining
working set information. Microsoft also follows our second
recommendation of omitting the share count information,
to prevent indirect observations on working set changes in
other processes.
It was also surprising that Windows allows changing the
working-set size for another process. If this would be re-
stricted, it would be much more difficult to reliably evict
across processes. The performance of our covert channel
would decrease if VirtualUnlock did not have the “fea-
2We use sudo perf stat -e ’syscalls:sys enter mincore’
-a sleep 18000 for this purpose.
ture” that it removes pages from the working set if they are
not locked.
Alternative approaches like page locking, signal burying,
or disabling page sharing are likely not practical for most use
cases or impose significant overheads.
Preventing Efficient Eviction while Increasing the System
Performance. On Windows, we used working set evic-
tion instead of page cache eviction as on Linux. We ver-
ified that the approach we used on Linux, i.e., page cache
eviction, also works on Windows. However, it performs
much worse than on Linux and optimizing the eviction ap-
peared to be far more tricky. One reason for this is that with
working-set-based algorithms, processes cannot directly in-
fluence the eviction probability for pages owned by or shared
with other processes [8, 16, 17]. On Linux, we are only able
to evict pages efficiently because we can trick the page re-
placement algorithm into believing our target page would be
the best choice for eviction. The reason for this lies in the
fact that Linux uses a global page replacement algorithm,
i.e., an algorithm which does not distinguish between dif-
ferent processes. Global page replacement algorithms have
been known for decades to allow one process to perform a
denial-of-service on other processes [8, 16, 17, 61].
Working-set algorithms deplete these denial-of-service
situations and they also increase the general system perfor-
mance by making more clever choices for eviction candi-
dates [8, 16, 17]. Hence, switching to working-set algo-
rithms on Linux, as on Windows [61], makes our attack
less practical. We can also transfer this insight to hardware
caches: If hardware caches would use replacement algo-
rithms that guarantee fairness in a similar way, attacks like
Prime+Probe would not be possible anymore, because the at-
tacker would rather evict its own cache lines, rather than the
one required by the victim process. This is a larger change,
but it might make remote attacks that rely on page cache
eviction less practical.
10 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a variety of local and remote attacks
against the page cache used in modern operating systems,
thereby highlighting a new source for side- and covert chan-
nels that is hardware and timing agnostic. On the local front,
we have demonstrated a high-speed cross-sandbox covert
channel, a UI redressing attack triggered by a side channel, a
keystroke-timing side channel, and password-recovery side
channel from a vulnerable PHP script. On the remote front,
we have shown that forgoing hardware agnosticism permits
a low profile covert channel from a local malicious sender,
and a higher profile side channel. The severity of this attack
surface is exacerbated by the variety of isolation techniques
that share the page cache, including regular Unix processes,
sandboxes, Function-as-a-Service platforms, managed lan-
guage runtimes, web browsers, and even select remote pro-
cesses. Stronger permissioning, as we recommend, will help
against some of our local attacks.
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